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Abstract. Philip Kitcher and other secular naturalists assert that we have a problem-free 
concept of the “mundane physical world” and use the idea of our familiar material world 
to critique those who recognize a transcendent reality as in theism. It is argued that the 
naturalist’s concept of the world faces problems involving the primacy of the mental, 
normativity, sensations and consciousness, and contemporary science. A closing section 
suggests, contra secular naturalism, that our experience of the mundane world can be 
suffused with a sense of the transcendent, as we find in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. This 
conclusion is supported by reference to other work.
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Philip Kitcher is representative of philosophers who believe we have 
a problem-free understanding of the world without any of the troubling 
features of the transcendent. “The core of secular doubt is skepticism about 
anything ‘transcendent’” (Kitcher 2014, 3). Kitcher proposes that all histor-
ical claims about the transcendent are evidentially impoverished compared 
to “the mundane world”: “Religions are distinguished by their invocation 
of something beyond the mundane physical world, and they offer claims 
about this transcendent” (Kitcher 2014, 2). Mario De Caro and Alberto Yol-
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tolini likewise assume that the “familiar natural world” is non-mysterious 
and possesses none of the obscurity of the supernatural: “By ‘supernatu-
ralism’ I mean the invocation of an agent or force that somehow stands 
outside the familiar natural world and whose doings cannot be understood 
as part of it” (De Caro and Voltolili 2010, 71). In a recent, excellent book on 
contemporary naturalism, Fiona Ellis documents the many ways in which 
philosophers have insisted on a trouble-free understanding of the natural 
world, compared to which God, objective, moral properties, and normativi-
ty are “irreducibly odd,” “very weird,” “spookingly different,” “too spooky,” 
“irredeemingly weird,” “alien,” occult and magical,” a “region of darkness,” 
and a “super-addition to the world” (Ellis 2014, 51, 58, 63, 74, 82, 86, 88).
In this essay, I contend that we have abundant reasons to think that the 
world as it appears to us is far from supporting a problem free-metaphys-
ics, epistemology, and theory of values. Reflection on familiar, “mundane” 
aspects of the world as we experience it, gives rise, instead, to serious ques-
tions that welcome some response that involves the transcendent. In some 
respects, I will be drawing attention to areas with which readers should 
be philosophically familiar. But readers rarely consider these areas as an 
accumulation of factors that both makes an appeal to the mundane and 
makes the familiar world problematic. Specifically, I draw attention to the 
problem of how to understand the mundane world in reference to norma-
tivity, sensory qualities and consciousness, and contemporary physics. Most 
importantly, the first point to appreciate is that we often fail to appreciate 
the role of concepts and the mental in even thinking at all about the phys-
ical world. In a concluding section, I suggest that among the many reasons 
for the persistent appeal to the transcendent is the fact that many persons 
seem to experience the transcendent through the “mundane world,” due 
also to an appreciation of the ostensible contingency of the mundane world.
1. The very idea of the physical world
Although the following claim may seem trivially true, it is radically under 
appreciated: the idea that we live in the physical world is itself an idea. 
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Our access to physical and material things, i.e., events, objects, processes, 
is invariably and inescapably by way of what is classified as the mental. 
This is by way of any number of different terms (the terms ideas, concepts, 
beliefs, theories, frameworks, images –as in the scientific or manifest imag-
es). An example of a brazen, unapologetic statement of materialism that 
seems (in the mind of its author,) to eschew the mental is found in the work 
of Daniel Dennett:
The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is materialism: there 
is only one sort of stuff, namely matter –the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, 
and physiology –and the mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. 
In short, the mind is the brain. According to materialists, we can (in principle) 
account for every mental phenomenon using the same physical principles, laws, 
and raw materials that suffice to explain radioactivity, continental drift, photo-
synthesis, reproduction, nutrition, and growth (Dennett 2001, 33).
Note what this often-cited passage seems to require us to believe in: that 
there is such a thing as wisdom, and this wisdom is expressed and argued 
for. Presumably, arguments essentially involve providing reasons for ac-
cepting some positions and rejecting others. In the book in which this pas-
sage appears, Consciousness Explained, one of the principle objectives is to 
demonstrate why dualism in philosophy of mind should be rejected. Howev-
er, note how important it is that Dennett’s enterprise seems to commit us all 
to believing that authors exist as substantial individual beings who are self-
aware and aware of other persons who act intentionally to bring about real 
changes, in the beliefs of other persons and in their actions. The passage 
also commits us all to believing that we possess ideas or concepts about the 
mental, the concept of materialism, matter, explanations that are exclusive 
(“nothing but”), and a concept of the brain. We also must acknowledge all 
that goes along with physics, chemistry, and physiology. Presumably these 
three forms of inquiry are inconceivable without there being persons who 
are scientists who make observations, engage in criticism, theory-construc-
tion. The scientists are conscious self-aware beings with the full repertoire 
of sensations, thoughts, and so on. I propose that it is absurd to think one 
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can have a clearer grasp of anything Dennett refers to in the passage than 
one can have of the concept (or idea or thought) of what Dennett refers to.
The nature of physics, as a practice, is not something you can have 
a more clear grasp about than you can have a clear grasp of the concept of 
physics and the multitude of concepts of all that constitutes and is involved 
in physics as a practice. Moreover, explanations of the kind that Dennett 
invokes — radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis, reproduction, 
nutrition, and growth—all require a certain grasp and reliance on complex 
mental activity. All the extant theories of causation and explanation of 
whether they appeal to laws of nature, primitive or basic causal powers, 
or the laws of nature or counterfactuals, all invariably involve appeal to 
our ideas (or concepts or beliefs or thoughts) about causation, basic causal 
powers or the laws of nature or counterfactuals. So, where and what are 
ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and so on? Do they take up space in the same 
fashion that radioactivity or continental drift take up the space they do?
I am not, on this occasion, offering a sustained case for dualism (see 
Goetz and Taliaferro 2011). I am merely drawing attention to how even 
referring to the mundane physical world involves recognizing the reality 
of thoughts, ideas, concepts and these do not have about them a matter of 
fact, common sense, and obvious place philosophically. It is sufficient at 
this stage of this essay to maintain that while philosophers like Dennett 
and Kitcher presume that we have a clear grasp of that which is physical, 
this presumption seems challenged by the thesis that we have, and nec-
essarily have, a clearer grasp of that which is mental than that which is 
physical, even if it turns out that what we call the mental turns out to be 
that which we call the physical.
To reinforce this point, consider one of the crudest expressions of 
materialism in print: “If you can’t kick it, or at least spray it, you should 
treat it with some suspicion” (Dupre 2004, 38). Anticipating the material 
in the next session, I suggest that the activity of kicking or spraying is not 
possible without sensations and consciousness. It is also not conceivable 
without intentions and having the ideas or concepts of kicking, spraying, 
and suspicion. Thus, how would one go about kicking or spraying ideas of 
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concepts? The same is true about beliefs and doubts. Presumably, to be 
suspicious involves doubting some beliefs or thoughts or ideas. Let us now 
turn to other areas of the supposedly mundane and familiar physical world 
that cries out for serious philosophical attention.
2. Normativity
While there are naturalists who regard normativity as “weird,” they cus-
tomarily do so on the basis of reasons, as we have seen in the passage cited 
from Dennett’s Consciousness Explained. A problem arises, however, when 
we take note that “radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis, repro-
duction, nutrition, and growth” do not involve processes of reasoning, or 
any reasons. One continent does not drift to the other on the basis of an 
argument. If the criterion for a satisfactory account of mind is limited to 
the same principles that explain radioactivity etc., then the account must 
not involve any irreducible appeal to reasoning. That is, accounts of rea-
soning must be accounted for in terms that do not involve any reasoning. 
I propose and have argued elsewhere (see Taliaferro 1994, and Goetz and 
Taliaferro 2011) that explaining reasoning in terms that eliminate reason-
ing as an irreducible element undermines the very phenomenon of reason-
ing itself. If asked what is the smallest perfect number, I reply 6 because 6 is 
the smallest number equal to the sum of its divisors, including 1, but not 
including 6 (1+2+3=6). A calculating machine can also be programmed to 
generate the number 6 when asked to identify the smallest perfect number, 
but no one thinks that a very primitive calculating machine thinks or is 
engaged in reasoning of any kind whatsoever. Controversy emerges with 
highly sophisticated machines, but the controversy is usually a matter of 
wondering whether a machine can develop mental powers not whether 
mental powers can be eliminated. Dennett’s appeal to machine intelli-
gence, incidentally, provides us with confirmation that he is an eliminativ-
ist with respect to the mental (see Taliaferro and Evans 2013).
Fiona Ellis rightly notes how the evidence of normativity in our rea-
soning about matters in general, and in ethics in particular, provides good 
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reason for thinking there is something that transcends what is apparent to 
us in the physical and social sciences. She puts this point modestly:
The notion of normativity is hardly perspicuous and, in a moral context, has 
tended to go hand in hand with talk of the special authority or “binding force” 
of morality – it is said to be “inescapable” in some special way. We cannot 
assume the authority of such talk, nor that it poses an intractable difficulty 
for the scientist. However, it certainly seems amenable to the idea that there 
is a source of value that comes to us from without, and it seems plausible to 
suppose that this source grants just the kind of intrinsic normative element 
which is said to be problematic by the lights of our current social scientist. 
(Ellis 2014, 28).
Even if normativity can be eliminated or reduced to secular naturalism, it 
certainly provides us with a reason for thinking that an appeal to a com-
mon sense, familiar, mundane physical world is neither straightforward 
nor simple. The same is true, in my view, when it comes to taking seriously 
sensory experience and consciousness itself.
3. Sensations and Consciousness
We first have the age-old questions about what are often called secondary 
properties: does the mundane physical world smell? Does it make sounds? 
Does it taste a certain way? Does it feel hot or cold? And once we have 
sensations in our ontology, we face the problems facing the identity theory 
(the Mary argument or knowledge arguments) defended recently to great 
effect by Richard Fummerton in Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Du-
alism. Fummerton relentlessly highlights the overwhelmingly evident fact 
of the matter that we are acquainted with sensations or that we undergo 
sensory states and these are not identically the same thing as the brain 
states identified by materialists. “Acquaintance is a real relation and its 
obtaining is contemporaneous with the existence of its object. One can’t 
use a razor [as in Ockham’s razor] to slice away from one’s ontology one’s 
searing pain” (Fummerton 2013, 247).
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The extensive literature that currently defends the irreducible, evident 
reality of consciousness and its non-identity, with what materialists iden-
tify as the physical world, is tantamount to evidence that Kitcher’s and 
others’ references a problem-free understanding of the physical world is 
not warranted. (See work by Mark Baker, George Bealer, Lawrence Bonjour, 
Matthew Dickerson, Stewart Goetz, H.L.A. Hart, William Hasker, Robert 
Koons, Angus Menuge, Daniel Robinson, Richard Swinburne, Charles Talia-
ferro, Peter Unger, Dean Zimmerman).
Now consider one other obstacle to thinking that an appeal to the fa-
miliar, mundane physical world, versus the transcendent, is problem-free.
4. Contemporary Physics
It was fairly commonplace in the 19th and early 20th centuries to think that 
materialism is in concert with an appeal to the physical sciences. Subse-
quent science, however, seems to expose us to a world that seems to shatter 
a straightforward, simple understanding of what it is to be physical. Noam 
Chomsky contends that we currently lack consensus on what counts as 
physical:
What is the concept of body that finally emerged? The answer is that there is 
no clear and definite concept of body. If the best theory of the material world 
that we can construct includes a variety of forces, particles that have no mass, 
and other entities that would have been offensive to the “scientific common 
sense” of the Cartesians, then so be it: We conclude that these are properties of 
the physical world, the world of body. The conclusions are tentative, as befits 
empirical hypotheses, but are not subject to criticism because they transcend 
some a priori conception of body. There is no longer any definite conception of 
body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever 
properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory. 
(Chomsky 1988, 144)
Anthony Kenny, perhaps the greatest living historian of philosophy, takes 
note of how contemporary science has removed our confidence in common 
sense materialism.
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At one time it seemed as if a robust and substantive naturalism could be eas-
ily stated. This was a conception that thought of the world as being made up 
of solid, inert, impenetrable and conserved matter – a matter that interacts 
deterministically and through contact. But twentieth-century physics posited 
entities and interactions that did not fit the materialist characterization of 
reality, and which took science far away from a world of solid, inert, massy 
material atoms. (Kenny 2013)
In this section, I rely on three other authorities as providing reason for 
thinking that Kitcher et al, are not supported by current science in thinking 
we have a problem-free concept of the mundane, familiar physical world. 
Here is Bitbol: ‘Material bodies are no longer the basic objects of physics... 
Ironically, the notion of material body motivated the very research that 
eventually dissolved it.” (Bitbol) And from Crane and Mellor: “The ‘matter’ 
of modern physics is not at all solid, or inert, or impenetrable, or conserved, 
and it interacts indeterministically and arguably sometimes at a distance. 
Faced with these discoveries, modern materialism’s modern descendants 
have understandably lost their metaphysical nerve.” (Crane, Mellor 1990, 
186) Finally, in An Outline of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell observes: “Matter 
has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritual séance” (Russell 1927, 78).
5. Religious Experience Through and In the Midst of 
a Contingent Cosmos
It will be too much of a burden to attach to this short essay an extensive 
account of theism as a coherent, even cogent alternative to secular nat-
uralism. Stewart Goetz and I have argued for the implausibility of nat-
uralism in the book Naturalism (2008) and the failure of the critique of 
theism advanced by naturalists. And I have defended the evidential power 
of appealing to the transcendent, theism in particular, in various places, 
including “In Defense of the Numinous.” I shall appeal, instead, in this fi-
nal section to a literary treatment of how the experience of the mundane, 
physical world can provide a setting in which the experience of God is not 
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“irreducibly odd,” “very weird,” “spookingly different,” “too spooky,” “irre-
deemingly weird,” “alien,” occult and magical,” a “region of darkness,” and 
a “super-addition to the world.”
Consider the character Levin in Tolstoy’s classic Anna Karenina. Levin 
is a wealthy landowner who is haunted by death and the contingency of 
his life and the world itself. What is the meaning of life? He marries and 
seeks refuge in gambling and his searching for life’s meaning seems at first 
hopeless. He finds the mundane, familiar world profoundly unsatisfying 
and absurd. Still, near the end of the novel, he undergoes a transformation:
Suddenly, in the midst of his toil, without understanding what it was or whence 
it came, he felt a pleasant sensation of chill on his hot, moist shoulders. He 
glanced at the sky in the interval for whetting the scythes. A heavy, lowering 
storm cloud had blown up, and big raindrops were falling. Some of the peasants 
went to their coats and put them on; others—just like Levin himself—merely 
shrugged their shoulders, enjoying the pleasant coolness of it.
Another row, and yet another row, followed—long rows and short rows, 
with good grass and with poor grass. Levin lost all sense of time, and could not 
have told whether it was late or early now. A change began to come over his 
work, which gave him immense satisfaction. In the midst of his toil there were 
moments during which he forgot what he was doing, and it came all easy to 
him, and at those same moments his row was almost as smooth and well cut 
as Tit’s. But so soon as he recollected what he was doing, and began trying to 
do better, he was at once conscious of all the difficulty of his task, and the row 
was badly mown. (Part III, Ch. IV)
Levin meets an old peasant who does not forget God. Levin asks him what it 
is like to not forget God. Levin replies: “Why, that’s plain enough. It’s living 
rightly, in God’s way.” (Part 8, Ch. XI)
Levin finds his experience of the mundane, physical world hallowed by 
a sense of the presence of the transcendent God, a transcendent God who is 
felt to be immanent. This is the very opposite of living as though an object 
of our belief is suspicious if you cannot kick it or spray it; it is quite distant 
from adopting a philosophy that calls into questions whether normativ-
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ity in general, ethics in particular, persons or consciousness or sensory 
experience do not exist as fundamental features of our world. The kind of 
spirituality that emerges with Levin constitutes a powerful challenge to 
a confident secular naturalism that claims to have a better grounding when 
it comes to offering a description and account of ourselves and the world 
we find ourselves in.
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